The last two decades have witnessed a modest revival of scholarly interest in the writings of Max Stirner, a contemporary of Marx and probably the most radical of the Young Hegelians. Not unpredictably, there are many different interpretations of Stirner’s ideas being offered; this diversity may, as Lawrence Stepelevich notes, “be provoked by any number of real or imagined connections with whatever or whomever is of current concern.” There are, in fact, many voices speaking out of the pages of The (...) Ego and Its Own and many subtle twistings in the complex line of inquiry that Stirner follows, so it is not altogether surprising that commentators differ on its meaning and significance. However, much of the secondary literature on Stirner has given a jaundiced view of his ideas, has been one-sided and partial, because it has failed to ask the right questions with regard to his central argument. Stirner takes his readers on a rigorous intellectual journey toward a confrontation with the most basic questions of ontology and axiology; in answer to them he offers a process theory of the self and a radically contingent view of moral choice, which have certain implications for political practice. A reconsideration of Stirner’s ideas is worthwhile in order to sort through the different voices and reconstruct the vision of the self and values that lie at the heart of his argument. (shrink)